

Teile eines Ganzen

European Network for the Study of Globalisation



European Support
Centre



Zentrum für
Interkulturelle Studien

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Vorwort

Das "European Network for the Study of Globalisation (ENG)" widmet sich der interdisziplinären Forschung in Richtung einer Theorie der Globalisierung. Das Netzwerk wurde im Jahr 2007 gegründet und wählte als Standort Fürstenfeld. Dort wird die Initiative vom Zentrum für Interkulturelle Studien maßgeblich unterstützt.

Trotz ihrer Omnipräsenz wird Globalisierung heute noch immer unzureichend verstanden und es fehlt insbesondere an theoretischen Konzepten, die das Fundament für gestaltende Eingriffe legen. Angesichts dieser Situation haben die Mitglieder des Netzwerks die Initiative ergriffen und arbeiten an Konzepten, die es ermöglichen, aus einer Globalisierung, die einfach geschieht, eine Entwicklung zu machen, die von einer erarbeiteten theoretischen Grundlage ausgehend aktiv geformt werden kann.

Die vorliegende Publikation gibt die Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse des zweiten Netzwerktreffens im März 2008 in Fürstenfeld wieder. Der Titel "Teile eines Ganzen" erlaubt zweierlei Interpretationen. Zum einen stellt die Globalisierung einen Prozess dar, in dessen Rahmen die einzelnen Regionen des Globus mit ihren spezifischen Eigenheiten zu einem größeren Ganzen zusammenwachsen. Zum andern betont der Titel die Notwendigkeit einer Globalisierungstheorie, die die existierenden Theoriefragmente zu einem Ganzen zusammenfasst. Hier stehen wir erst am Beginn der Arbeit.

Weitere Information stehen zur Verfügung auf der Webseite
<http://www.clubofrome.at/globalisation/zisff/>

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From the Logic of Difference to the Global Changes

(About the Radical Turn in the Cases of the Other, the Otherness, and the Interculturality of 2000)

Endre Kiss

The concept of the Other, of the Otherness, and of Interculturality appears in a definitely new context in recent years. This change is apparently neither problem-free nor safe. The term “change” namely often evokes the idea as if raising the same question in a different context could possess a meaning of its own. Up to this time, the perpetually broadening discourse about the Other, Otherness, and Interculturality was considered an “open way”, i.e. as part of an extension of emancipation. This orientation of the discourse prevailed with the overwhelming power of self-evidence, thus it became part of the international discussion right in this self-evident and self-fulfilling manner.

This turn from a logic of identity to a logic of difference is anchored in the modification of background dimensions. The approach of identity, which opens itself and sublates (*aufheben*) the Other and the Otherness is not founded by any kind of particular identity. The fact that this logic of identity had been based upon all-human (and not particular) values, which had been interpreted as the values of a civilization, has obviously disappeared from the consciousness of historical actors. The attitude towards the Other in the light of identity therefore grounded the universality of the matter of civilizational values, in which the particularity closed up in itself had not yet wholly taken part.

The original relation has been extended, as this issue of the Other, the Otherness, and Interculturality is not generally about the general variables “identity” and “difference”, but now it is about the variables “identity” and “difference” depending on concrete civilizational values.

In the case of a classical logic of identity, there is a common platform assumed in the communication of Otherness, which serves as a basis for the intercultural process. The identity that prevails in the intercultural process can never be one of the one side only. And it's right the civilizational all-human component that hinders the improper approach of identity. The classical basic model of interculturality defined this way is therefore built upon difference, and arrives to an idea of identity, which is built upon civilizational values, as the founding forces of identity.

What makes the situation even more confuse is the fact that difference – and the logic of difference even more – has been evolving for a long time in the same direction with emancipation. In other words, up to this time, the semantics of difference has

been an excellent positive one. Long decades have passed in terms of difference with a perpetually extending meaning of liberalization and emancipation, while identity, especially in context of interculturality, acquired homogenizing, if not straight totalitarian traits. In the century of totalitarian dictatorships, the logic of identity got consequently corrupted, because the decisive difference between a logic of identity with civilizational and all-human foundation and the same logic without civilizational and all-human foundation has not been materialized. This provides an illuminating example of how the shadows of totalitarianism can eliminate real all-human values when the political community lacks a sufficient reflective basis.

Today, when searching for the actually relevant characteristics of the logic of difference, we find not just singular and particular phenomena of this logic to describe. The logic of difference is actually fully represented by both the leading and the all-round philosophical tendencies of our time. The logic of difference becomes the instructive idea of both ruling philosophical approaches of our global world. For today, we have two all-round tendencies, and both of them manifest exclusively the logic of difference. But how is the logic of difference, generated by these two all-round tendencies, connected to the questions of the Other, Otherness, and Interculturality?

Beside the logic of difference and global individualism - it's globalization itself that re-shapes the relations to the Other and the Otherness dramatically. It triggers huge new migration processes, ensures the necessity of this migration, and transforms the problem of the Other and Otherness into a new historical quality.

It's evident that globalization can be described the best in the form of a macro-theory. This leads to one of the most important characteristics of the basic definition itself: globalization is therefore the process, in which a critical proportion of huge functional systems become global. This description shows that although it's "the" economy or "the" capital that becomes global, the "reality of globalization" today can no more be reduced to these phenomena. It is being constituted by qualitative leaps, which are made up by the globalization of other huge functional systems.

In contrast to the macro- and the micro-level, it seems quite evident why the medium- or meso-sphere of new globalized structures are of the greatest importance for all social relations. This privileged position is obviously not a result of a special theoretical approach. This is so because globalization can theoretically only be described in the context of macro-dimensions. The importance of the meso-sphere lies in the constellation that it is not just a new face of globalization, but it is a real place for social life. On this level does the globalization confront with human and social dimensions. This is where it turns out to be the new condition humaine of social existence. This meeting is not trivial at all. The globalization exceeds the anti-

anthropomorphic, non-human dimensions of social life ever known before. It has rules of its own, which though may not be totally antagonistic, but they confront the deals, traditions, and human values of society in a definitely hostile manner. Social life has namely never been "anthropomorphic" (human); not even before the time of globalization.

It's time to make our fundamental statement about the most decisive interdependence between the meso-level of globalization, and the new hegemonous logic of difference. The logic of difference is only possible under the circumstances of globalization. It doesn't mean that this logic would be the very ground of the logic of difference. But globalization, mainly on its meso-level, shapes the structure and system of the circumstances, in which a logic of difference is thinkable.

How European is Globalization?

Historiography in the Age of Transnational History

Hans-Peter Söder

The historiography of universal history was never universal in the sense that it panoptically tried to include extra-European cultures. Voltaire's *Essay sur l'histoire générale* was set in depuis Charlemagne. And the mere title of Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1787) makes it clear where the universe ends. Even the world histories of the nineteenth century see the non-European world, if they include it at all, largely as a preface to European culture. In the historiography of European history today, there is indeed much ambiguity about the universal aspects of European history, where universal could mean everywhere present, or, as it does for Samuel Huntington, a uniquely universal Western culture with Pirenne's old motto "the West against the rest." In his 1947 critique of Toynbee's universal history, *A Study of History*, Northrop Frye has well-characterized the problems of this kind of diachronic stasis when he summarizes Toynbee's work: "A Study of History presents an enormous mass of historical material, strung along a thin line of argument, often represented only by a single word, generally Greek." [1] Frye's criticism of such a monism is on the mark, as the end of the Cold War demonstrated that European history and ideas are neither stable nor recognizable. Gone are the post-World War II days where overcoming Hitler's totalitarianism in itself defined European identity. Also gone are the days of the Iron Curtain where Europe, in opposition to Soviet totalitarianism, defined itself as the bloc of Western societies.

In a programmatic article on European identity penned by Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida in 2003, European identity is defined in terms of Europe's cultural history. There, European identity is based on the idea of democracy and such dispersed factors as Christianity, capitalism, natural sciences and technology, romantic law, the Code Napoléon, the bourgeois-urban lifestyle, human rights, and the secularization of the state and society. [2] This is not a new approach of course, as it is indebted to the judgements of Max Weber on the Sonderweg of the West. Weber's famously leading question in his introduction to the sociology of religion.

As a universal history of global capitalism, globalism's list of European world-historical achievements is encapsulated within the concept of "the West", the German *Abendland*, or the French *l'Occident*. A map of Europe depends then on the particular items of "universal significance and validity" that one includes in the Weberian list. And so is the whatness of Europe answered by the whereness of Europe, and vice versa. The make-up of the Habermasian-Derridean list, for example, the idea of the individual, determines the number of possible Europes: the Christian Occident, Latin Europe, Vergil's Europe, a Rhenisch Europe, a German-French Europe, etc. This

notion that there exists a certain particular Western historical thinking that allows an intellectual localization of the term "the West" remains to be one of the most seductive elements in the Weberian approach toward defining "Western" globalization. The multi-perspective approach that I have employed thus far makes it clear that the field of "European" history is transnational by its very nature. In this respect, universal history is no longer a meta-science. The modern universal historian, if there were such a person, would not aim at replacing, outdoing, or devaluating European history in favor of a new "global" history. Modern historiography needs to contextualize those historical ideas that can neither be adequately comprehended nor represented by documentary history.

The purpose of studying "European" ideas then, is to ensure that their twin, European history, does not lose sight of the universal impact of its world historical achievements. These European achievements are not the Inquisition, not the Crusades, and certainly not the wars of annihilation. Pursuing European ideas in terms of their universal applicability is to see the ideas of the Enlightenment as a forward-looking universal history of morality. Universal history does not have to be Werner Sombart's division of the world into either merchants or heroes, nor does it have to be Carl Schmitt's struggle for the *Großraum*. [3] Seen with Schiller's eyes, it is a conception that is not determined by the medieval past. Faced with the choice of a Europe that sees its origin in the clash between Christianity and Islam and a Europe embracing the principles of *égalité* and *fraternité*, it seems that the latter might be a more sensible myth for the universal history of the future.

Notes

1. H.N. Frye, "Toynbee and Spengler", *The Canadian Forum*, XXVII, No. 319, August, 1947: 111. Cited in: William H. Dray, *Philosophy of History*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964, 83.
2. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31. May 2003, 33. Cited by Thomas Meyer, *Die Identität Europas*, Frankfurt/M, 2004, 85.
3. Werner Sombart, *Händler und Helden*. See also Werner Sombart's *Der moderne Kapitalismus: Historisch-systematische Darstellung des gesamteuropäischen Wirtschaftslebens von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1919.

Against the Unending Sleep of “Obviousness”

10 Thesis About the Present Meaning and Orientation of Global Research

François de Bernard

Introduction

In 2008, as in 1999 (the Seattle WTO’s meeting moment), what we have used to call “Globalisation” - following Bill Clinton, Mikhaïl Gorbachev, Arjun Appadurai or Joseph Stiglitz - remains an extraordinarily complex, multi-faceted and confusing issue. The profit and loss account of economic Globalisation stays fiercely debated by “pro” and “anti”. The major social, cultural, environmental, epidemiologic and financial disasters contemporary of the ongoing Globalisation wave are widely considered as its “results” or side effects, but other analysts strongly deny such interpretation. More and more, Globalisation is conceived as a “well known” process, phenomenon or subject. More and more it is used as a striking argument or universal explication: an unlimited source of ready-to-wear “answers”... But less and less, it looks problematic per se. On the contrary, the so-called “Globalisation debate” appears as no more than a new Realm of Obviousness. That is why I would like to propose a critical and trans-disciplinary discussion of the ten following theses:

1st Thesis:

Global issues, Global studies, research on Globalisation(s) are certainly neither obsolete nor outdated. The more “Globalisation” is perceived as a mere “fact” that we should only accommodate to, the more it proves a suspect, ambiguous and deceiving concept upon which we need to mobilise all the critical resources of Philosophy and the Humanities.

2nd Thesis:

“The End of Globalisation” motto should be heard as the expression by its promoters of the following wish: that with such a “Globalisation death” decree will simultaneously cease all critical investigation, all comparative approach, all philosophical enquiry, all scientific revaluation of conflicting Globalisation figures and processes.

3rd Thesis:

On the reverse, we should sustain this standpoint that the considerable field of “Research and studies on Globalisation(s)” — field which has been invested by critical thinking for no more than a decade — currently experiments only its initial phase.

4th Thesis:

What has been achieved worldwide for about ten years by different individual contributions and collective work - be they academic or not -, is not to be neglected: i.e. an already impressive de-construction work (sub-field by sub-field), associated with a deeply rooted conceptual discussion, completed by a decisive reformulation of the Globalisation(s) conceptual vocabulary, and therefore of its critical dictionary.

5th Thesis:

The limits that have been reached by this multilateral, trans-national, trans-disciplinary movement of critical thinking, weakly organised but lively and performing, were above all: i) an insufficient circulation of concepts and research produced within the media, political and economical spheres; correlatively: ii) a poor capacity to modify normative paradigms on Globalisation used by journalists, political and economical leaders — and subsequently also: a poor capacity to generate inflexion of their “Global affairs” vision and management.

6th Thesis:

The future of “Research and studies on Globalisation(s)” is nothing but obvious, first of all due to the point stressed in Thesis n°2. Not only these research and studies motivate very few people - even within the academic world -, but they are also widely perceived as useless, even within the so-called “progressive” groups and parties. Such statement implies that the next step should be focused on a quasi lobbyist strategy, aimed at circulating core ideas developed for the last decade and at convincing more and more people of the pertinence and indispensability of Global research.

7th Thesis:

The huge and compulsory trans-disciplinary effort that it requires proves to be a very strong limit to the expansion of such research field. Indeed, we do not live in the times of Diderot, Condorcet, Kant, Hegel and their like, who would have been much better intellectually equipped than we are in order to “think Globalisation(s)”, due to their multilateral Bildung. What appears critical for the advancement of Global research is therefore both i) to become individually more and more “trans-disciplinary”, and ii) to convince usually reluctant Universities to change their mind about trans-disciplinary studies, so that they support such studies particularly concerning the Globalisations field of investigation.

8th Thesis:

Emphasis on the multilingualism issue is also critical for a profitable development of Global research out of its normative expansion path. Indeed, it looks daily more dangerous to approach Global issues through the sole bias of English, German or French. “Globe”, “Welt”, “monde”, “globalización”, “globalização”, “mondialisation”, aside their translation in other Indo-European languages, need to be confronted with their “equivalent” and their “different” in the Buddhist, Islamic, Guarani, Yoruba or Inuit traditions — a confrontation to be carried out in the long run.

9th Thesis:

We should never forget that “Globalisation” is a cultural issue — i.e. i) it is first of all a cultural issue and ii) it is a cultural issue. First of all means that the perception, understanding, description of “Globalisation” is cultural before being economical, political, social... Cultural means that the substance, features or evolution of “Globalisation” are intimately linked to cultural references and cultural debates.

10th Thesis:

The future of “Research and studies on Globalisation(s)” is not written. As of now, it may even look “open”. But it will soon be judged on the capacity of such research and studies of modifying the own judgement of non-intellectual leaders about the diverse and contradictory Globalisation projects. And of providing these leaders with objective and serious reasons of privileging the emergence of a true “Cosmopolitical citizen” (Weltbürger) rather than of a mere “Global consumer”.

Final note:

What is and remains at stake in this process would be a shared understanding of the ontological difference existing between, on the one side:

i) an authentic “world” (mundus politicus) where could be experimented plural “mondialisations” (mundializations?), respectful of human rights, human dignity and cultural diversity,

and, on the other side:

ii) a pure “globe” where could only reign - without alternative - a unique and lethal pattern of Globalisation.

Is There Future Without Alternative?

László Molnár

The two pole world ceased to exist. On the one hand the world of two conflicting systems gone with the wind. On the other hand the process of globalization has made substantial progress. And, it seems that the US, which is now the only superpower, to meet the requirements of its new role has failed as shown by war in Iraq and huge trade deficit. Definitions of globalization summarize views of the actors about the issue and about themselves. Therefore it is worth to consider some of them in detail.

1.1. Definition by the IMF (International Monetary Fund, 2006)

“Globalization is defined broadly as the acceleration in the pace of growth of international trade in goods, services and financial assets relative to the rate of growth in domestic trade. At the global level, this encompasses the growth spurts in key emerging market economies / notably China and, to a lesser extent, India. Globalization has overlapped with economic and financial deregulation in many countries and with the information technology revolution.” The IMF is focusing on international economic processes, in particular on financial and economics deregulation and on the IT revolution. Its definition emphasizes a very important aspect, because it refers to the economic and political ideology and practice of globalization, to the neoliberal guiding principles of the Washington Consensus. The term Washington Consensus was coined in 1989 by John Williamson to describe a relatively specific set of ten economic policy prescriptions that he considered to constitute a "standard" reform package promoted for crisis-wracked countries by institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and U.S. Treasury Department. Its main principles of policy are: trade liberalization, liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation. These express the neoliberal spirit of reforms. The reform packages of IMF and World Bank, which have been recommended for emergent countries have been based on these policies, too. They became universal policy principles, as panacea, to be applied everywhere and were the guiding principles of economic reforms in all over the world. I would not say that this politics and policy has been a success story but rather speak about their contradictions and unsolved problems. Two facts should be emphasized: the problems of democracy and inequality.

1. 2. Democracy and/or globalization?

The International Forum on Globalization speaks about its non-democratic character: „the present worldwide drive toward a globalized economic system dominated by supranational corporate trade and banking institutions that are not accountable to democratic processes or national governments.” (www.ifg.org/analysis.htm). Another

problem is inequality. Some people say: it is not a specific problem of globalization, there were always inequalities, and without them economy does not work. The problem is its measure and character related to both individual and society.

Inequalities as Symptoms of Failure of Modern States

The Encarta Encyclopedia describes inequality: "By the late 1990s the 20% of the world's people living in the highest-income countries had 86% of the world's income; the bottom 20% had only 1% . An estimated 1.3 billion people, or about 1/6 of the world's population, have incomes of less than a dollar a day. More than 80 countries had lower per capita income at the end of the 1990s than they had at the end of the 1980s. In 1960 the top 20% had 30 times the income of the poorest 20%. This grew to 32 times in 1970, 45 in 1980, and 60 in 1990. By the end of the 20th century the top 20% received 75 times the income of the bottom 20%. The income gap is even apparent in cyberspace. The top fifth in income make up the 93% of the world's Internet users and the poorest fifth only 0.2%." These statements refer to global conditions of globalization showing the great gap between developed and "developing" countries. The huge differences are so substantial that they in themselves are able to undermine the chances of political democracy in these countries. The inequalities have also impact on the functioning of states: „These inequalities in living standards and participation in the global economy are a serious political problem in an era of globalization. Some countries have been unable to function at even a minimum standard of basic competence in a globalized economy. The only profitable economic activity in some of these countries is linked to criminal behavior, such as the trade in illegal drugs, smuggling, and extortion of various kinds. Governments that are helpless to stop such activity or to collect taxes to meet basic public service needs are failed states. Sometimes failed states can become havens for terrorists and foreign criminals who use them as bests for activities."

Considering this, we can say that the term "failed states" can be related to most of states of our time. The main problem is that states are no more able to collect enough taxes for financing their institutions. Therefore there has been substantial gap between state income and public expenditure. Negative balance of account has been the rule and the surplus has been the exception in the countries all over the world:

Trends of Balance of Payments According to the OECD

- Account balances since 1993: Negative: in: Australia, Hungary, Mexico, New Zealand, Spain, the UK, the US. Since 1993 account balances shifted from deficit to surplus: in Austria, Canada and Germany. Surpluses: in Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland.
- Account balances 2004-2006: Negative: Deficits in average 5% or more of GDP: in:

Australia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, New Zealand, Portugal, Slovak Rep., Turkey, the US. Surpluses more than 5% of GDP: in: Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland.

Statistics demonstrate: (i) The problem of debt burden cannot be confined to developing countries or emerging economies, like Mexico or Hungary. (ii) Regarding the seriousness and incidence of the problem, it is worth considering a concept, which takes the problem of balance of payments as a necessary part of system of globalization. According to Endre Kiss it is about “monetarism”. He takes this term in a special sense, different from the concept of economics: “Monetarism is the standard basic complex of the recent political and fiscal world order, including the international order of mutually, internally and externally indebted states.” Regarding these facts I am not convinced that the neoliberal way is the only way of globalization. It seems acceptable to search for alternatives. A theoretical alternative can be a more general definition, like: “It is no more about emerging new, unknown power centers or a new world government. It is about a qualitatively new system of relations among the actors.” In my opinion it is acceptable, if globalization is not identified with neoliberalism and, we assume that another way of the course of events is possible.

The Transition to a Planetary Society – an Alternative Way to a Global Society

An interesting concept has been worked out about “the transition to a planetary society.”(Paul Raskin et al., Great Transition, 2002). The group discusses changes to a planetary society: „The global transition has begun - a planetary society will take shape over the coming decades. But its outcome is in question. On the dark side, it is all too easy to envision a dismal future of impoverished people, cultures and nature... But it is not inevitable. Humanity has the power to foresee, to choose and to act. While it may seem improbable, a transition to a future of enriched lives, human solidarity and a healthy planet is possible.” They think about futures in scenarios. Their main merit is that they set three critical alternatives (I did not find convincing their argumentation about the necessity of a transition to a “planetary society.”):

1. Conventional Worlds: no major surprise, no major discontinuity, no fundamental transformation. The current forces and values shape the future. Market and policy adjustments can cope with the social, environmental, economic problems.
2. Barbarization: The problems cannot be managed by the available tools. The situation transforms into anarchy and tyranny.
3. Great Transitions: towards changing the character of civilization. They avoid the trap of uncritical, apologetic identification of present trends with future reality. Their intention is to work out a positive utopia towards a “better society.” But their concept does not exclude the negative options, too. Even the option of relapsing into a world of anarchy and tyranny has been considered.

Integration – Diversität – Ethos

Uschi Nussbaumer-Benz

Während Assimilation auf Homogenität abzielt, wie u.a. die Geschichte von Antisemitismus und Nazismus im Extrem deutlich gemacht haben, beinhaltet Integration, einen Prozess der Differenzierung, der allerdings auch als Identitätsbedrohung empfunden werden und infolgedessen z.B. zu Antiglobalisierungsaktivitäten führen kann. Integration verlangt nach Auseinandersetzung mit den jeweils anderen Perspektiven und verspricht eine Erweiterung des Gesichtsfeldes auf beiden bzw. allen beteiligten Seiten, so dass Möglichkeiten sichtbar werden, zu neuen, konstruktiven und innovativen Ufern zu kommen – in diversen Lebensbereichen.

Das nicht zuletzt infolge zunehmender Migrations- und Integrationsproblematik auch in Schweizer Wirtschaftsunternehmen aufkommende Diversity-Management will Unternehmen für die Vorteile einer – nicht nur ethnisch und religiös-kulturell – vielfältigen Gesellschaft im Rahmen ihres eigenen Betriebes sensibilisieren und unterschiedliche Einstellungen, Erfahrungen, Handlungen, ungewohnte Sicht- und Vorgehensweisen grundsätzlich wertschätzen – was vielen Menschen schwer fällt, da nicht jede/jeder die Bereitschaft und die nötigen Fähigkeiten zu Perspektivenwechseln hat und Nutzen für sich selber und den Betrieb daraus zu ziehen versteht. Erfolgreiche multikulturelle Teams, so hat sich gezeigt, nehmen die Unterschiede wahr, vermeiden kulturelle Dominanz und suchen nicht einfach einen Mittelweg; sie einigen sich auf gemeinsame, mit den unterschiedlichen kulturellen Normen und den Zielen des Betriebs vereinbare Regeln. So können sie ihr kreatives Potenzial nutzen und auftretende Konflikte konstruktiv lösen. Mehr oder weniger notgedrungen (Mangel an Arbeitskräften im eigenen Land, Kunden aus anderen Kulturkreisen etc.) könnten Wirtschaftsunternehmen, und zwar nicht nur die grossen „global players“, sich so durchaus als veritable Integrationsförderer profilieren.

Einen Schritt in diese Richtung machte auch der dissidente katholische Schweizer Theologe mit Pioniergeist, Hans Küng, mit seinem Weltethos-Konzept, indem er nebst Vertretern der drei wirkungsmächtigsten monotheistischen Religionen, Judentum, Christentum, Islam, sowie diverser anderer Religionen, auch Unternehmer ansprach, sie für dieses sein Konzept zu gewinnen sucht. Zu erwähnen ist, dass sogar Vertreter des „Neuheidentums“ zu den Erstunterzeichnern des Weltethos-Dokuments gehörten. Für Küng bringt das von ihm konzipierte Weltethos eine von den Menschenrechten (die Menschenrechtserklärung wurde - notabene - vom Vatikan nicht ratifiziert) nicht berücksichtigte emotionale Komponente, „das Herz“, mit ins Spiel. Küng zufolge können die Religionen der Welt nur dann einen Beitrag zum Frieden der Menschheit leisten, wenn sie sich „auf das ihnen jetzt schon Gemeinsame im Ethos besinnen“.

Die Grundlagenforschung, ein zentrales Anliegen des Projekts, heisst es (alle Zitate aus <http://www.weltethos.org>), „fand ihr erstes großes Resultat in der »Erklärung zum Weltethos«, die das Parlament der Weltreligionen 1993 in Chicago verabschiedete und dessen Entwurf unter Federführung von Hans Küng im Institut für ökumenische Forschung der Universität Tübingen entstand.“ Mit dieser Erklärung haben sich die Unterzeichnenden auf vier Weisungen verpflichtet: auf eine Kultur der Gewaltlosigkeit und der Ehrfurcht vor allem Leben; der Solidarität und einer gerechten Wirtschaftsordnung; der Toleranz und eines Lebens in Wahrhaftigkeit; der Gleichberechtigung und der Partnerschaft von Mann und Frau.

Die in dieser Erklärung ausgesprochenen Prinzipien können, so Küng, global von allen Menschen mit ethischen Überzeugungen, religiös begründet oder nicht, mitgetragen werden. Religionen aber können erreichen, „das »Herz« des Menschen zu verändern und ihn zu einer »Umkehr« von einem falschen Weg zu einer neuen Lebenseinstellung zu bewegen. Die Menschheit bedarf der sozialen und ökologischen Reformen, gewiß, aber nicht weniger bedarf sie der spirituellen Erneuerung. Wir als religiös oder spirituell orientierte Menschen wollen uns besonders dazu verpflichten – im Bewußtsein, daß es gerade die spirituellen Kräfte der Religionen sein können, die Menschen für ihr Leben ein Grundvertrauen, einen Sinnhorizont, letzte Maßstäbe und eine geistige Heimat vermitteln. Dies freilich können Religionen nur dann glaubwürdig tun, wenn sie selbst jene Konflikte beseitigen, deren Quelle sie selber sind, wenn sie wechselseitig Überheblichkeit, Mißtrauen, Vorurteile, ja Feindbilder abbauen und den Traditionen, Heiligtümern, Festen und Riten der jeweils Andersgläubigen Respekt entgegenbringen.“

Grundlagenforschung als zentrales Anliegen des Welt-Ethos-Projekts: Karl-Josef Kuschel, Vizepräsident der Stiftung Weltethos, betont, ein anderes Glaubensverständnis sei „zuerst einmal“ als gleichwertig zu respektieren, und da die drei monotheistischen Religionen „miteinander vernetzt sind“, könne jede ihren Wahrheitsanspruch beibehalten, was nicht mit einem, dem je eigenen, Absolutheitsanspruch gleichzusetzen sei (z.B. werden Christen „nie aufgeben, dass Jesus Gottes Sohn [und notabene Teil des dreifaltigen einen Gottes] ist und nicht nur einer unter vielen Propheten“). Die Initialzündung ergab sich für Kuschel, als er 1990 in einer Dialog-Gruppe in den USA zum ersten Mal den Namen Abraham von muslimischer Seite hörte. Als zugleich Theologe und Literaturwissenschaftler sucht er seither über gemeinsame Erzählungen eine globale Vernetzung zwischen Judentum, Christentum und Islam zu schaffen. Es erstaunt, dass diese Nähe erst so spät entdeckt wurde, seitens der Theologen. Freilich: besser spät als nie. Zudem dürften, pragmatisch betrachtet, die Grundsätze des Weltethos-Projekts in einer Welt zunehmender Globalisierung zur Integration von Migranten in bestehende Kulturbereiche wie auch generell zu gegenseitigem Respekt und Toleranz beitragen; zunächst einmal. Doch dass sie damit, wie von Küng gefordert, auch „selbst jene Konflikte beseitigen, deren Quelle sie selber sind“ (und

die m.E. langfristig womöglich unterhalb der Bewusstseinsschwelle weiter ihre Wirkung tun werden), sei hier in Frage gestellt. Und zunächst auf eine Äusserung von Michel Bollag, Ko-Leiter des Zürcher Lehrhauses, verwiesen, die sich durchaus mit Erkenntnissen betr. erfolgreicher Zusammenarbeit multikultureller Teams deckt: Hans Küng „[...] sieht zu wenig das, was unterschiedlich ist. Letzteres [...] ist vor allem das, was zu Konflikten Anlass gibt. [...] sein Ansatz reicht [...] nicht aus“.

Eine andere gemeinsame Erzählung wurde von Theologen offenbar noch nicht wahrgenommen: Bereits in den ersten Jahren des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts stellte Otto Franke, deutscher Orientalist und Übersetzer des frühbuddhistischen Kanons, fest, wie sehr eine dort wiedergegebene, bereits uralte Erzählung von einem grossen Menschen mit derjenigen vom jüdischen Messias, und d.h. das buddhistische mit dem messianischen Ideal(!), übereinstimmt (und zwar bis in kleine, sonderbare Details). Offenbar ebenfalls nicht wahrgenommen wurden die erstaunlichen Textparallelen in der Mahdi- und der jüdischen Messias-Vorstellung, die vom Islamwissenschaftler Udo Schaefer Anfang des einundzwanzigsten Jahrhunderts aufgezeigt wurden.

Wenn es zutrifft, wie verschiedene wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen ergeben haben, dass Prägungen Ergebnisse entscheidend mitbestimmen (es „trumpfen Männer bei Aufgaben so richtig auf, die ihnen zuvor als klassische Kerledomäne verkauft wurden. Umgekehrt schneiden Frauen plötzlich besser ab bei Mathe-Aufgaben, wenn man sie im Glauben lässt, einfach nur ein Problem zu lösen – dass es ein im Grunde mathematisches war, blieb ihnen verborgen“; Spiegel Special 1/08), wenn solches also zutrifft, dann dürfte ein ausführlich beschriebenes Detail in jener Erzählung im buddhistischen Kanon langfristig Wirkung zeitigen und eine relativ neue, integrative Geschichte im Rahmen der Globalisierung initiieren: Die Tatsache nämlich, dass einer jungen Frau, einer Hetäre, das buddhistische Rad zugeordnet wird und sie die asketische Wahrheit der Maya-Welt der Buddha-Jünger zu einem Wettspiel herausfordert, sie in einer geradezu postmodernen Wendung (als Frau Sinnlichkeit, somit das Perspektivische signalisierend) unterläuft, sich dabei aber zum Ideal im Sinne der weltbezogenen, politischen und gesellschaftlichen ethischen Prinzipien bekennt, und zwar in einem globalen Kontext. Die Entstehung der grossen Erzählung vom Idealtypus freilich wird vom Indologen Heinrich Zimmer zwischen das dritte und vierte Jahrtausend vor Christus datiert, wo der Beginn der jüdischen Zeitrechnung liegt ...

Fazit: So genannten Kultur-MuslimInnen und Kultur- bzw. säkularen ChristInnen wie JüdInnen und ganz allgemein Nicht-Gläubigen, nicht zuletzt auch aus den in jüngerer Vergangenheit atheistisch geprägten Weltgegenden und inkl. der streitbaren aktuellen Atheisten (Humanisten) meist angelsächsischer Prägung, präsentiert sich damit eine neue Möglichkeit grundlegend facettierter Identität im global vernetzten neuen alten Ideal, dem sich auch traditionell Gläubige verpflichten dürften, die persönlichen Sinn und Halt in ihrem Gottes-Glauben finden.

Wallerstein's World System Theory in the Light of Critique

Gábor Budai

This contribution attempts to give an outline of the critical assessments of Immanuel Wallerstein's complex social theory. In the past three decades there has been a diverse body of work evaluating the significance and the possible shortcomings of his world system theory. The text draws attention to three analysts, namely Carlos Martinez-Vela, Giovanni Arrighi and Theda Skocpol.

Analysis by Carlos Martinez-Vela

Martinez-Vela's argument is valid in saying that world-system research is largely qualitative, although earlier Wallerstein rejected the distinction between nomothetic and idiographic methodologies to understand the world. For Wallerstein there is an objective world which can be quantitatively understood, but it is a product of history, no matter how long it has existed. But for the most part, his methods are associated with history and with interpretive sociology. For that very reason Martinez-Vela can say that Wallerstein's work is methodologically somewhere in between Marx and Weber, both of whom were important inspirations for his own work. In fact, we will find that there are indeed definite parallels between the aim of Wallerstein's research work and that of Weber's social theory. First of all, both of them intended to provide a theoretical, historical and cultural explanation of the birth and development of modern world-capitalism. Weber considered the treatise "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" an essay of cultural history and not a sociological study. Weber intended to combine historical with theoretical approaches to social reality and to establish the universal cultural significance of the rise of capitalism. Wallerstein's project showed similar tendencies: he generated an all-embracing theory that went beyond the boundaries of pure sociology. Another common point in their work is that for both of them Marx is the main point of reference. But whereas Weber elaborated his theses in opposition to the Marxian standpoint, we can consider Wallerstein's concept as an extension of Marxist social theory. That is to say, Weber rejected in principle the Marxist view that all spheres of human activity, notably the state and the cultural sphere, are determined by the economy. For Wallerstein, however, the economy is the most important explanatory factor.

Analysis by Giovanni Arrighi

Wallerstein implemented, as Giovanni Arrighi underlined, a radical reorientation of social research. This means that Wallerstein advanced a theoretical and historical account of the origins, structure and eventual demise of the modern world-system. Central to this account was the conceptualization of the Eurocentric world-system as

a capitalist world economy. A world-system, on the one hand, was defined as a spatio-temporal whole, whose spatial scope is coextensive with a division of labour among its constituent parts and whose temporal scope extends as long as the division of labour continually reproduces the „world“ as a social whole. A world-economy, on the other hand, was defined as a world-system not encompassed by a single political entity. Historically world-economies tended towards disintegration or conquest by one group and hence transformation into into a world-empire, that is, a world-system encompassed by a single political entity. The world-economy that emerged in sixteenth-century Europe, in contrast, displayed no such tenency: not only did it survive but it became the only world-system that has ever succeeded in expanding its outer boundaries to encompass the entire world.

Nevertheless, according to Arrighi, Wallerstein failed to explain how and why in the course of the „long“ sixteenth century the European world-economy metamorphosed into a capitalist world-economy. Arrighi points out that world-economies have to a greater or lesser extent existed throughout world history without becoming capitalist. Besides, in order to account for the capitalist metamorphosis of the European world-economy in the „long“ sixteenth century one has to explain what kind of competitive pressures triggered and sustained this transformation.

Analysis by Theda Skocpol

Theda Skocpol takes a critical look from an other aspect at the ideas about determinants of socioeconomic and political structures that are built into Wallerstein's model of the world capitalist system. Skocpol says, the most problematic points can be demonstrated if we see that the model is based upon a two-step reduction: first, a reduction of socioeconomic structure to determination by world market opportunities and technological production possibilities; and second, a reduction of state structures and policies to determination by dominant class interests.

Without pretending to offer a fully worked out alternative paradigm, Skocpol suggests that, instead of exclusively pursuing Wallerstein's world-system approach, the world-historical emergence and development of capitalism should be investigated in terms of hypotheses about variations in both (1) institutionalized class relations of production and exchange, and (2) patterns of state structures and interstate relationships, without simply reducing the latter to the former in a vulgarmarxist way. This in turn means that markets and patterns of trade will remain the part of the picture, but, as Skocpol adds, it seems unlikely that they can be understood in their origin, functioning and effects solely with reference to changes in class and political structures. The alternative picture of world capitalism that is likely to emerge from historical analyses will probably go with intersecting structures (for example class structures, trade networks, state structures and geopolitical systems) involving

varying and autonomous logics and different, though overlapping, historical times, rather than a single, all-encompassing system that comes into being in one stage and then remains constant in its essential patterns until capitalism as a whole meets its demise.

In short, despite his avowed desire to avoid „abstract model building“, Wallerstein in fact deals with historical evidence primarily in terms of a preconceived model of the capitalist world-economy. In other words, Skocpol finds the aspect of Wallerstein's approach very disturbing because it has the effect of creating an impenetrable abyss between empirical historical findings and social science theorizing.

Comments

In my opinion from this remarks the following conclusion can be made: Wallerstein's world-system theory shouldn't be categorized as either a sociological or a historical study. I would rather define it as a marxist social ontology – in the Lukácsian sense. First of all let me explain why I labelled it as a marxist social ontology. As Martinez-Vela points out, from Marx Wallerstein adopted the following ideas: (1) the fundamental reality of social conflict among materially based human groups, (2) the concern with a relevant totality, (3) the transitory nature of social forms and theories about them, (4) the centrality of the accumulation process and competitive class struggles that result from it, (5) a dialectical sense of motion through conflict and contradiction. Actually Wallerstein's real ambition has been to revise Marxism itself. And why did I call it a Lukácsian way of ontological view? As is well-known, the 'totality' as a philosophical term was a central category for the early marxist Georg Lukács. And precisely this is the term that Wallerstein made a reference to in one of his landmark essays, making an explicit allusion to Georg Lukács' main work *History and Class Consciousness*.

To summarize: the world-system theory is a comprehensive, philosophically based, explanatory concept – a project that aims at explicating the social produced by modernity in its complexities. Let us not forget how courageous undertaking the creation of the world-system theory is.

Continuing to construct theories aiming to explain (and perhaps transform) the world around us is an everlasting challenge to sciences – social and philosophical alike.

Political Theory and Globalization

Balázs Brunczel

In this contribution I analyze the connections between political theory and globalization. The term “political theory” has here a very special meaning, which doesn’t coincide with its customary usage. The term with this meaning stems from Luhmann, but we can use it without accepting Luhmann’s whole theory.

To understand this special meaning of political theory we have to draw a distinction between two types of the political system’s description. The first type is the description by the science, this is a scientific theory about politics, and Luhmann refers to this as theory of politics. The second type is the self-description of the political system, and this is what Luhmann calls political theory. In the following I will talk about this second one. Let us now look at some characteristics of political theory by Luhmann. Firstly, it is not a scientific theory. Therefore the term “theory” is not the best choice of Luhmann because it is a bit misleading. Hearing this term we usually think about something written, structured or well formed. But the political theory is not such a thing. Under political theory we may actually understand concepts on the politics, which are not written and structured but they provide a coherent picture on the politics, and therefore they can orient the practice of politics.

Secondly, political theory is needed for the proper functioning of political system. With the help of political theory politics can formulate alternatives therefore this theory gives certain direction for the politics. Luhmann says that the most important achievements of modern politics – like sovereignty, representation or human rights – are implemented with the help of political theory. Thirdly, political theory is usually about the state. By Luhmann we can find more definition for the state, one of them is that the state is the self-description of the political system. We said that political theory is also the self-description of politics, so the two terms are very close to each other.

Therefore under political theory we have to understand concepts on the state. E. g. in the 19th century this was – of course not exclusively but maybe dominantly – the concept of state of the law or that of liberal state, and in the 20th century the concept of the social or welfare state. These state-concepts played important role in implementing the liberal and social rights. The political theory has a special character, namely it must comply double requirements: the requirements of the politics, and those of the science. Regarding the political requirements – because political options must compete on the parliamentary elections – political theory must provide attractive, popular and acceptable options for the people. Today this means mainly that political theory must be able to provide options for fulfilling the social

claims. On the other side, political theory must comply certain scientific requirements, namely it must provide financially, organizationally realizable and operable programs. It is easy to admit that these two requirements can confront, and especially today they do it. Namely the claims toward the welfare state can not be fulfilled because of the financial limits. In our theoretical framework this means that there isn't any operable political theory today, and problems or shortcomings of the welfare state are partly due to the lack of such a theory.

It is important to discuss the question of the connection between political theory and ideologies because they seem to be very similar, maybe the same. Their connection is not clear by Luhmann but we can try to reconstruct it. On the one hand, we said that the achievements implemented by political theory are e.g. sovereignty, representation, human and social rights. But these achievements are usually connected to definite ideologies. We may say that political theory in the 19th century was mainly formed by liberalism and in the 20th by social democracy.

But there is another possible aspect of the connection between political theory and ideologies. We may say that political theory is broader than ideologies and it gives a framework, a context, in which the alternatives of the ideologies can be formulated. According to this, if we have a proper political theory, we can see the ideological alternatives clearly. This can also describe our present situation: today we can not see the clear alternatives of ideologies and this can be attributed to the lack of any proper political theory. Now I turn to the question of globalization. We said that political theory is actually about the state. But it is easy to admit that today we can not talk about the state without the globalization, because the globalization strongly influences the possibilities and characteristics of the state. We can conclude that the political theory today can not avoid the question of globalization. Summing up, I see the importance of analyzing political theory in three points.

Firstly, political theory is a good tool for describing the problems and shortcomings of our society, especially those of the welfare state. Secondly, political theory provides arguments for the importance of theory of globalization. And this means that globalization is not only theoretically important, but practically as well, because political theory has practical functions. And thirdly, analyzing political theory shows that not only a political program, an alternative is lacking today, but the framework or context in which such alternatives could be formed.

Identität im Kontext der Globalisierung

Jörg Mirtl

Wer sind wir, wer bin ich in einer Welt, die sich scheinbar immer schneller um sich selbst dreht? Dieser Frage haftet etwas seltsam Antiquiertes an. Und in der Tat erscheint jene nach dem „Wie?“ heutzutage viel zeitgemäßer: Wie organisiert sich der Mensch, oder vielmehr: Wie werden die Flüsse an Waren, Ideen und Informationen geregelt? Wir selber scheinen zu diesem „Wie“ zu werden, zu einer Art und Weise einer Organisation jener Welt, die schon längst mit dem Globus identisch ist.

Aber worin besteht diese Globalität eigentlich, die so oft herbeizitiert wird? Da ist von einer völlig neuen Epoche die Rede, von Firmen, die Firmen kaufen und wiederverkaufen, von Immigration und brain drain, vom global village, von Weltmusik, Internet und Terrorismus. All das klingt recht heterogen, und doch sprechen wir von der Globalisierung im Singular ganz so, als sei sie das Selbstverständlichste auf der Welt.

Imperien gab es schon immer, und noch mehr Potentaten, die sich selbst als Herren der Welt sahen. Auch heute hat die Globalisierung ganz offenbar mit Machtverhältnissen zu tun. Doch kam es früher nie zur völligen Gleichheit von Welt und Globus; jedes Imperium hatte seine düsteren Ränder, hinter denen nur Barbaren wohnten, deren Kolonialisierung nicht notwendigerweise als lohnenswert erachtet wurde. Heute kennt das Imperium keine Herrscher mehr und auch keine Schranken; wir leben in einer globalisierten Welt, die kein Außen mehr hat, deren Grenzen noch bestenfalls die des Individuums und seiner Identität sind.

Was aber ist diese Identität, von der so oft die Rede ist? Identität ist unser Wesen, sie stellt den Zusammenhang zwischen unserem Bewusstsein und der Lebenswelt her und steht für die von uns gesammelten Erfahrungen. Wir identifizieren uns also mit unserer Umgebung und bilden so unsere persönliche Geschichte. Eine Geschichte, die sich zudem von jener der anderen unterscheidet. Identität ohne Andersheit ist unmöglich, Unterschiede sind so konstitutiv für die menschliche Entfaltung wie Gemeinsamkeiten. Was aber, wenn diese Differenzen schwinden, weil sich die Lebenswelten aller Menschen gleichen?

Die Globalisierung wird heutzutage vor allem mit wirtschaftlichen Abläufen in Verbindung gebracht. Aber sie ist zunächst insbesondere ein Vorgang der Homogenisierung. Dies verweist auf ein Schwinden der Differenzen und auf eine zutiefst abendländische Idee: Alles, was hier möglich ist, ist überall (urbi et orbi) denkbar und durchführbar. Das ist gleichwohl nichts Neues: Städte, Königreiche, Nationen – alle trachteten sie nach Homogenisierung. Neu sind hingegen die Endgültigkeit und die Grenzenlosigkeit, die dem Prozess der Globalisierung innewohnen.

Zwei politische Folgen ergeben sich daraus: einerseits die völlige Auflösung der Identität, andererseits die konservierende Affirmation derselben. Beide Vorgänge sind jedoch zum Scheitern verurteilt. Der Mensch braucht Identität als Brücke zu einer sich wandelnden Welt wie sein tägliches Brot; sie ist somit aber vor allem auch ein Prozess und darf keineswegs mit ihrer Instrumentalisierung durch radikale politische Strömungen verwechselt werden. Die Folklorisierung von Lebenswelten ist nichts anderes als Wasser auf die Mühlen der globalen Homogenisierung. Dabei muss betont werden, dass die Humanität sich stets durch jenes andere auszeichnet, welches so vielfältige Formen annehmen kann: Immigration, neue Theorien, Kunst, kulturelle Vielfalt, Emanzipation und nicht zuletzt die Fremdheit gegenüber uns selbst, die wir einem ständigen Wandel unterliegen.

Nehmen wir also die eingangs formulierte Frage wieder auf: Wer sind wir in einer globalisierten Welt? Es wäre verfehlt, auf diese Frage eine allzu genaue Antwort zu geben, da sich Identitäten nicht von außen oktroyieren lassen. Wichtig aber ist, dass wir im globalen Zeitalter überhaupt noch jemand sind und dass wir gleichzeitig jenes andere garantieren, welches für die menschliche Entfaltung stets von so großer Bedeutung war.

Media Dilemmas - Marshall McLuhan

Arpad Hudra

1989 is not usually cited as the time when the McLuhan media theory emerged victorious, although that year might even be considered a turning point in world history. In other words, the end-of-history universal philosophy situation and the victory of neo-liberalism could coincide with television, as a global medium, objectively integrating the world, the latter of which was predictable. Media theoretician Joshua Meyrowitz wrote: "Growing consciousness of globalism has encouraged every single country of Eastern Europe to enter the television arena at the appropriate moment." (Meyrowitz, Joshua: Medium Theory, in Information society and communication technology theory and key concepts [In Hungarian] Századvég Publishers, 3004, 231 p.)

The media itself is the message, McLuhan said. That provocative statement might sound like a basic tenet of technical determinism, topped with the addendum that the content of the message is really another medium. At the same time, McLuhan defines medium with an extremely broad brush. As we know, this type of medium is basically the extension of a human being in the physical sense, the lengthening of a sensory organ, of a physical ability. In other words, the wheel is the "lengthening" of human ambulation, and the message of the wheel-medium is not the place we roll to on it but the degree of transformation of spatial and physical and social relations that are the consequence of its existence. At the same time, McLuhan, a Canadian, also treats ideals as media. So we can and should think about what to do with a concept as broad as his is. In our view, the "message" of the provocation is that the media are functional concepts, so what we are seeing is the appearance of increasingly new functional systems and not simply technical tools. That the content of the message is another medium also suggests this.

McLuhan's idea is not systems theory as Niklas Luhman's, who, as K. Ludwig Pfeiffer pointed out in his work "Medial and Imaginary," reminds us that on technical, operation levels, the media - as loose connections between elements - can be distinguished from the comparatively solid connections between elements - such as forms (speech, writing). In addition, the forms are dependent on the media, while the media are incentives to create the forms. The difference exists for both sides, meaning that the components of the media can be conceived as forms and these forms can be conceived as comparatively solid links between components. In other words, for both McLuhan and Luhman, the media are continuously imbedded in one another, which, as we have already pointed out, makes studying them an essentially ambiguous project. According to Pfeiffer, the tests of these theories are the descriptions that they make possible. Again, he cites Luhman, who claims that the

forms reinforce the media, which gave them shape while offering them the opportunity to collect in new links with altered functions. He also cites an example of this from McLuhan, the railway, which, using its own contents as media of motion and transportation, led to a completely new set of cities, work and leisure activity. As of today, these configurations have disappeared, thanks to the airplane.

About forty years ago, McLuhan must have noticed a phenomenon that has really peaked in our times. Media that tended to be empty of content or only partially filled had appeared, and we are seeing a growing number of examples of this. The development, the "taming" of our means of communication has truly become a problem. Even television, the author's primary medium, was a completely unexpected and unwished for discovery, something that was not really dreamed about. The consequences of its appearance were unpredictable. It appears that television with its effect of altering civilization in a paradigm shift was what McLuhan considered the best support for the statement that the media itself was the message. According to the author, the first true medium of the Age of Electricity was the telegraph, but television was the cold medium that simultaneously drew in the user as an active contributor and made possible the establishment of a global-level collective unconsciousness that extended beyond verbalism. However, before we begin discussing the re-tribalization of the world, let us continue analyzing the statement itself.

The meaning, as his contemporaries have pointed out, is not singular for it contains multiple references. The first is that we refer the means of communication to itself, in other words, the final meaning of the means of communication is of itself the means of communication.

The author gives us the second meaning of this succinct conclusion as follows: a medium is something that shapes and/or monitors the level and forms of human companionship and activity.

The third statement is that the message of a communication medium is equal to its effect on society, thus the message of the movie as a medium is that it is a transition from a linear relationship to a configuration.

Under the watchword of complexity, McLuhan was really dulling the senses, since his goal was to criticize the most intellectual of the senses, vision. While McLuhan emphasized the simultaneity of perspectives, the significance of investigating the sensory organ through its structural conditions as opposed to the linear cause-effect outlook, he simply lost the intellectual complexity. In our view, the biggest problem is that McLuhan treated language merely as a tool of communication, separate from humans, and not as an essential component of their being. Meanwhile, language is an ability that exists only through its manifestations, its performance. Speech, therefore,

is no more the birthplace of clear thought than writing. This original world of thought may be restored in the Age of Electricity with the appearance of a global collective unconsciousness amidst a new tribalization. At the same time, McLuhan admits that the wholesome thoughts elaborated in the Gutenberg galaxy appear as a part of day-to-day life, that objectivity and critique have not lost their functions. So, we believe that McLuhan's great undertaking to restore human complexity, by which he principally meant sensory complexity, cannot but fail, because it would lead to the loss of the intellectual nature of the senses and that thought itself would sink to a sublingual state. Therefore, "discovery" of the grammar of the senses appears to be an exciting undertaking, with the analyses or probes as the author calls them, really based on a static human image.

Das Ende der Globalisierung

Thomas Schauer

Definitionen, die Vorurteile rechtfertigen

Neben den Befürwortern einer weltweiten ökonomischen Vernetzung gibt es eine starke Gegenbewegung, die ein Ende der gegenwärtigen Globalisierung herbeisehnt. Aber wie stabil ist diese befürwortete, geschmähte oder einfach nur hingenommene Globalisierung eigentlich? Ist sie ein Phänomen, das einer Naturgewalt gleich über die Menschheit kam und alles, was sich ihr entgegenstellt, hinwegfegt? Oder ist sie ein Trend, der sich abschwächen und zum Stillstand kommen könnte, den man vielleicht erst dann vermisst, wenn die Folgen seines Fehlens bemerkbar werden?

Im folgenden soll der bisher wenig untersuchten Frage nach der Stetigkeit des Phänomens nachgegangen werden. Dabei stellt sich zunächst das Problem der Definition. Bei einem umstrittenen Phänomen wie der Globalisierung kann es nicht ausbleiben, dass die Definitionen divergieren. Je nachdem, welche realen Trends man unter Globalisierung subsumiert, ist es möglich, die Rechtfertigung einer positiven oder negativen Haltung bereits im Keim anzulegen (Etwa durch Betonung globaler Wohlstandsgewinne oder zunehmender Vermögenskonzentration). Daher soll an dieser Stelle keine finale Definition angestrebt werden, sondern lediglich eine vorläufige Begriffsbestimmung: Unter Globalisierung soll eine Entwicklung verstanden werden, die sich manifestiert durch: (i) eine Intensivierung der weltweiten Kommunikation, (ii) eine Erhöhung des Volumens internationaler Finanztransaktionen und (iii) eine Zunahme des internationalen Waren- und Dienstleistungsaustauschs.

2. Heute über ein Ende der Globalisierung nachdenken?

Wenn wir die heutige Ära der Globalisierung als neue und irreversible Entwicklungsphase der Menschheit ansehen, so entspringt dies der Überheblichkeit des Zeitalters. In der Menschheitsgeschichte gab es immer wieder Perioden, die man als globalisiert bezeichnen kann, wenngleich sie nicht die gesamte Erdoberfläche einschlossen. Die Streuung der archäologischen Funde römischer Münzen zeugt davon ebenso wie überraschende Daten über Reisegeschwindigkeiten in früheren Zeiten: Die Lokomotivbaureihe 61 beförderte in den 30er Jahren planmäßig Züge zwischen Berlin und Dresden in 102 Minuten über die 176 km lange Strecke (Die schnellste Verbindung, die die Bahn im März 2008 anbot, benötigte 125 Minuten).

Es gab in der Geschichte immer wieder Perioden mit Globalisierungstendenzen und solche, in denen weiter reichende Kommunikation und internationaler Austausch weniger ausgeprägt waren. Daher ist es durchaus angebracht, sich über ein mögliches

Ende der gegenwärtigen Globalisierungsperiode und die daraus resultierenden Konsequenzen, sowohl negativer als auch positiver Art, Gedanken und auch Sorgen zu machen.

3. Die Komplexität der Komponenten

Kommunikation, Finanztransaktionen und Waren- und Dienstleistungsaustausch waren als Komponenten der Globalisierung genannt worden. Diese hängen zusammen und die Interaktionen erlangen Bedeutung, wenn man über die Verletzlichkeit des Phänomens Überlegungen anstellt. Eine Störung in einem Bereich würde nicht nur eine Komponente, sondern das gesamte System in Mitleidenschaft ziehen: (i) Die Intensivierung der weltweiten Kommunikation ist der Katalysator der Zunahme der Finanztransaktionen und des Warenverkehrs. Informationstechnologie macht global verteilte Produktion und Dienstleistungen möglich und erleichtert die Koordination des Transports von Gütern. (ii) Die finanziellen Transaktionen werden zwar zunehmend durch den Derivatehandel bedingt, ein Teil geht nach wie vor auf den Handel mit Waren und Dienstleistungen zurück und ohne schnelle Transaktionen wäre dieser Handel nicht möglich. (iii) Der Waren- und Dienstleistungsverkehr ist wiederum die Voraussetzung für das Funktionieren der informationstechnologischen Grundlagen. Ein Zentrum der IT-Produktion liegt in China und chinesische Steckernetzteile und Computerbausteine versorgen den ganzen Globus.

Die Verletzlichkeit der Globalisierung

Die Interdependenz der drei Komponenten könnte dann, wenn eine davon ins Stocken geriete, auch die anderen beiden und damit den gesamten Globalisierungsprozess beeinträchtigen und Folgen für alle Beteiligten haben:

- Die wirtschaftliche Elite wäre besonders tangiert. Sie profitiert am intensivsten von der gegenwärtigen Globalisierungsphase.
- Aber auch die Bezieher von Transfereinkommen wären betroffen. Wenn man das Versorgungsgleichgewicht in einem geschlossenen System betrachtet, so müssen jeweils diejenigen, die arbeiten können, die Waren und Dienstleistungen bereitstellen, die von den nicht Arbeitsfähigen benötigt werden. Durch die Überalterung müssen entweder in Zukunft die wenigen Arbeitsfähigen mehr arbeiten, oder Rentner erhalten weniger Rente, bzw. müssen höhere Preise für knappe Arbeit bezahlen. Angespartes wäre schnell verbraucht. Globalisierung bietet Auswege wie die Kompensation des Bevölkerungsschwundes durch Migration oder die Investition von Ersparnissen in Ländern, die auch in Zukunft hohe Produktivität und Renditen erwarten lassen. Ein Abbruch des internationalen Austauschs würde diese Möglichkeiten jedoch verschließen.
- Ketten für Billigtextilien und Haushaltsgegenstände florieren in Europa ebenso wie der Verkauf von Unterhaltungselektronik und PCs aus Asien. Blumen werden aus

Afrika importiert, Agrarprodukte aus Südamerika. Konsumenten in Europa profitieren von den Angeboten, die dadurch ermöglicht werden, dass ökologische und soziale Standards an den Produktionsorten niedriger sind und der Transport wenig kostet. Müssten diese Produkte wieder zu den in Europa üblichen Lohnkosten hergestellt werden, wäre abgesehen von einem positiven Beschäftigungseffekt eine Erhöhung der Inflationsrate möglich. Die Zeit, die Arbeitnehmer arbeiten müssten bis sie sich ein paar Schuhe leisten könnten, würde sich vervielfachen.

Globalisierung bis zum bitteren Ende ?

Wäre es angesichts der negativen Konsequenzen, die eine Verlangsamung der Globalisierung haben könnte, notwendig, gegebenenfalls helfend einzugreifen? Wenn man um die kurzfristige Stabilität des Systems fürchtet, sicherlich, wenn man den Endpunkt des Prozesses betrachtet, jedoch nicht. Die "Globalisierungsmaschinerie" läuft nicht ohne Energie. Energie wird benötigt für die Produktion von Waren, für Transport und für Kommunikation. Der Verbrauch der globalen Computernetze liegt bereits im Bereich des Energieverbrauchs durch den internationalen Flugverkehr.

Europa hat im Laufe seiner Industrialisierung eine Phase hoher Umweltzerstörung durchlaufen und danach die Schäden beseitigt (mit Ausnahme der CO₂ Emissionen). Die "Environmental Kuznets Curve" sieht doch allzu verlockend aus. Global funktioniert das Modell aber nicht: Europa hat die globalen Ökosysteme als Puffer verwendet. Wäre das CO₂, das Europa seit der Industrialisierung emittiert hat, in der Atmosphäre über Europa verblieben, wären wir durch den Treibhauseffekt zugrunde gegangen. Wenn sich nun die ehemalige Peripherie ähnlich entwickeln möchte wie der alte Kontinent, steht aber kein externer Puffer zur Verfügung und eine ökologische Katastrophe ist absehbar. Wir Europäer blicken derweil stolz auf renaturierte Flüsse und fahren mit "abgasarmen" Autos sinnlos durch die Gegend. Die Grenzen des Wachstums, vor 35 Jahren millionenfach gelesen, sind missachtet worden.

Die heutigen Globalisierungsprozesse haben eine nicht zu ignorierende materielle Grundlage. Die fossilen Ressourcen der Erde sind limitiert und die Ökosysteme sind nur begrenzt belastbar. Die gegenwärtige Phase der Globalisierung könnte bald Geschichte sein, von zukünftigen Psychologen und Soziologen ob ihrer inneren Widersprüche und sozialen Konflikte ausführlich studiert. In diesem Sinne wäre die Diskussion über eine Krise des Globalisierungsprozesses unter einem anderen Licht weiterzuführen. Eine Krise kann auch als eine Chance gesehen werden, die uns die Möglichkeit gibt, die Folgen eines ohnehin unausweichlichen Endes der Globalisierung in ihrer heutigen Form zu bewältigen und nach Wegen für eine "sanfte Landung" zu suchen. Letztlich wird es darauf ankommen, möglichst viele der positiven Errungenschaften des "globalen Dorfs" zu erhalten und diejenigen Trends, die zur Selbstzerstörung führen würden, aufzuhalten.

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